Navigating future pandemics

Reported by Abdulwahab Alshallal, CSaP Policy Intern

Navigating future pandemics

The CSaP Annual Conference hosted a compelling session on pandemic emergencies bringing together experts from academia and government to discuss strategies for preparing for future pandemics. The session featured presentations from Professor Clare Bryant, Professor of Innate Immunity, University of Cambridge, Dr. Lalitha Sundaram, Senior Research Associate, University of Cambridge, and Laurie Thraves, Head of National Situation Centre, Cabinet Office. The panel explored zoonotic risks, interdisciplinary approaches, and government response mechanisms, emphasising the need for proactive, data-driven preparedness.

Zoonotic threats and preparedness

Professor Bryant, a veterinarian and immunologist, underscored the persistent threat of zoonotic diseases, noting that all recent major pandemics - COVID-19, MERS, Ebola, Swine Flu, SARS-CoV-1, and HIV - originated from animal-to-human transmission. She highlighted their devastating toll: COVID-19 caused 6.83 million deaths and $12.5 trillion in global economic losses, while HIV claimed 36 million lives. Current risks, such as avian and swine flu, are rampant, with avian flu spilling into new species. Professor Bryant identified key drivers of pathogen emergence, including microbial mutation, antibiotic resistance, and differences in animal and human immune systems. She advocated for cost-effective prevention, noting that preparedness costs billions while pandemics cost trillions. Recommendations included leveraging AI for predictive strategies, enhancing pathogen surveillance, and vaccinating high-risk groups like farm workers to curb transmission.

Interdisciplinary risk management

Dr. Lalitha Sundaram introduced the Centre for Pandemic Risk Management at Cambridge; an interdisciplinary hub aimed at informing policy through comprehensive risk analysis. Referencing the UK’s 2023 Biological Security Strategy, she outlined risks from natural outbreaks, lab leaks, and deliberate misuse, such as bioweapons. Dr. Sundaram emphasised the concept of “engineered pandemics” where human actions, deliberate or accidental, exacerbate risks, citing HIV’s emergence in colonial Kinshasa as an example. She discussed an ongoing meta-analysis of over 50 pandemic tabletop exercises, which simulate crisis scenarios. Early findings suggest exercises often focus on human/zoonotic pandemics and tend to mimic recent crises, risking under-preparedness for novel threats. Dr. Sundaram called for more imaginative scenarios and better evaluation of exercise outcomes.

Government response and data integration

Laurie Thraves, from the UK Cabinet Office, detailed the government’s emergency response framework, centered on Cobra, which addresses national security risks, including pandemics and biological attacks. The National Security Risk Assessment prioritises biosecurity risks like emerging infectious diseases. Thraves highlighted the challenge of managing concurrent risks (e.g. pandemics and cold weather) and the need to break down silos for integrated risk management. The novel Biothreats Radar automates data integration using natural language processing, monitoring open-source intelligence, hospitalisations, and transport networks.

Follow-up discussion

The audience discussion explored critical challenges in pandemic preparedness, focusing on data gaps, research coordination, public trust, and global collaboration. Concerns were raised about insufficient data for contact tracing which remains a significant obstacle. Trade data requires granular information that would pose privacy concerns. Third contact tracing such as tracking bird migration is complex but a valuable alternative to more fine-grained approaches. Global cooperation was deemed essential, though trust issues, especially with countries like China, hinder data sharing.

Declining trust in experts and misinformation’s impact during COVID-19 were major concerns. The hostility faced by scientists underscored the need for transparent, compelling communication. Incorporating social capital and trust metrics into tabletop exercises was suggested to better anticipate public behaviour in crises.

Cross-national collaboration was seen as vital, given the global scope of pandemics. Multilateral organisations like the WHO and NATO are useful but limited by bureaucracy. Alternative forums, like the Biological Weapons Convention, were noted as complementary for data sharing. Learning from countries with effective pandemic responses was encouraged to repurpose successful strategies. On vaccination, early vaccination of farm workers was discussed as a way to reduce viral mutation and prevent human-to-human transmission, balancing timing to avoid targeting ineffective strains.

Overall, the session underscored the complexity of pandemic preparedness, necessitating collaboration across academia, government, and international partners. Zoonotic risks demand vigilant surveillance and targeted vaccination strategies, while interdisciplinary tabletop exercises prepare for diverse scenarios. The Biothreats Radar enhances real-time response capabilities, but challenges in data sharing, public trust, and global coordination persist.